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FINAL REGULATIONS ON HEDGING
— by Neil E. Harl*
After the Internal Revenue Service lost in the Tax Court
in 1993 on the issue of whether hedges produced capital
gain or loss treatment,1  the Department of the Treasury
issued temporary and proposed regulations abandoning its
position.2  The Service and the Treasury in the regulations
agreed that most hedging transactions are properly
considered to produce ordinary gains and losses.3  The
regulations have now been made final with a few
modifications from the regulations as proposed.4
Post-sale hedges
In the explanation accompanying the final regulations,5
the point is made that "a transaction that is not entered into
primarily to reduce risk" is not a hedging transaction.6  That
is in accord with the "insurance" test under which a taxpayer
using futures transactions to offset price changes in actual
commodities is engaging in a hedging transaction.7
The explanation goes on to say that a "store-on-the
board" transaction in which a taxpayer disposes of
commodities and then enters into a long futures or forward
contract is not a hedging transaction; the long position does
not reduce risk inasmuch as the actuals have already been
sold.8  This position is consistent with the case of Nicholas
C. Patterson.9  In that case, a farmer sold soybeans at
harvest because of inadequate storage and bought soybean
futures.  The transactions were held to be speculative and
not hedges on the grounds the taxpayer was not protecting
against risk of loss as to the actual commodities.  The court
rejected the argument that the transaction should have been
allowed as a "post hedge" on the grounds, as in Corn
Products Refining Co. v. United States,10 that the transaction
was an integral part of the business.
The explanation accompanying the final regulations
does, however, appear to sanction the hedging of deficiency
payments —
"The IRS and Treasury understand that there are
situations in which a taxpayer  engages in a store-on-
the-board transaction as a hedge of an expected
payment under an agricultural price support program.
In this situation, a long futures or forward contract




 Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and
Professor of Economics, Iowa State University; member of the
Iowa Bar.
The "actual" in this case is the right to receive a payment
based on the average price for the commodity during the
marketing year.
Hedging less than all of the risk
One of the objections raised by IRS in Federal Nat'l
Mortgage Ass'n v. Commissioner 12 was that the taxpayer
was not hedging all of the risk and, therefore, should not be
accorded hedging treatment.  The final regulations make it
clear that a taxpayer may hedge any part or all of the risk for
any part of the period during which the taxpayer has risk.13
Moreover, the frequent entering into and termination of
hedging positions is not relevant to whether transactions are
hedges.14 The regulations note that should be the outcome
"even if done on a daily or more frequent basis."15  The
regulations state specifically that "if a taxpayer maintains its
level of risk exposure by entering into and terminating a
large number of transactions in a single day, its transactions
may nonetheless qualify as hedging transactions."16  This
appears to represent a substantial easing of the position
taken in some audits that frequent lifting of hedges was
indicative of a speculative transaction rather than a hedge.
Reduction of overall risk
For a hedging program undertaken to reduce the overall
risk of the taxpayer's operation, the taxpayer generally does
not have to demonstrate that each hedge entered into
pursuant to the program reduced overall risk.17  A hedge of a
particular asset (or liability) is generally respected as
reducing risk if it reduces the risk attributable to the asset or
liability and if it is reasonably expected to reduce the overall
risk of the taxpayer's operations.18  Whether a transaction
reduces a taxpayer's risk is determined based on all of the
facts and circumstances surrounding the taxpayer's business
and the transaction.19
Noninventory supplies
In general, property is ordinary property and thus eligible
for ordinary gain or loss treatment in a hedge transaction
only if a sale or exchange of property could not produce a
capital gain or loss regardless of the holding period.20  Thus,
property used in the trade or business is not ordinary
property and is not eligible for ordinary gain and loss
treatment in a hedge transaction.21
Notwithstanding that fact, "noninventory supplies" may
be hedged if only a negligible amount is sold.22  A
noninventory supply "is a supply that a taxpayer purchases
for consumption in its trade or business and that is not an
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asset described in sections 1221(i) through (5)" of the
Internal Revenue Code.23  This is the so-called "jet fuel"
problem, which was not addressed in the proposed and
temporary regulations, and which also affects the hedging of
supplies acquired for use in a farm or ranch business.
In a transitional rule, the regulations acknowledge that a
taxpayer may treat as hedging transactions all hedges of
purchases of noninventory supplies for taxable years that
ended prior to July 18, 1994, and were still open for
assessment as of September 1, 1994, if, among other
requirements, the taxpayer did not sell in any of those years
more than 15 percent of the greater of the supply at the
beginning of the year or the amount acquired during the
year.24
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
ESTATE PROPERTY. The debtor filed for Chapter 7
in January 1992. In February 1992, the debtor applied for
disaster payments for 1990 and 1991 crop losses under the
federal Disaster Payment Program. In April 1992, the ASCS
paid the debtor $58,000 in disaster payments. The debtor
argued that the disaster payments were post-petition income
not subject to the bankruptcy case. The court held that the
disaster payments were in the form of proceeds for the crops
lost pre-petition; therefore, because the crops would have
been estate property, the disaster payments were the
proceeds of the crops and were estate property. In re Ring,
169 B.R. 73 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor claimed a homestead
exemption for a residence in which the debtor had $14,000
in equity and which was subject to judicial liens of over
$280,000. The debtor sought to avoid the liens as impairing
the homestead exemption. The Bankruptcy Court had held
that the liens did not impair the exemption because, under
Colorado law, judicial liens do not attach to homestead
property. The District Court reversed, holding that because
the mere existence of the liens could hamper the debtor’s
ownership rights in the property, the liens impaired the
exemption, but the court also held that the liens could be
avoided only to the extent of the debtor’s equity in the
property at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Matter of
Howard, 169 B.R. 71 (D. Colo. 1994).
HOMESTEAD. The debtors claimed a homestead
exemption for their motor home in which they resided on
land owned by a brother. The motor home was connected to
utilities and sewage lines and was the debtors’ only
residence. The court examined the Idaho homestead
exemption, Idaho Code § 39-4105(15), and found no
prohibition against claiming a motor home as a homestead
so long as the motor home was the intended residence. The
court noted that the statute had removed case law
requirements that the home be permanently affixed to land
owned by the debtors. The court also noted that the only
difference between motor homes and mobile homes, which
were expressly allowed for the exemption, was that the
motor home had a engine, a difference not covered by the
exemption statute. In re Peters, 169 B.R. 710 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
PLAN . A Chapter 12 debtor had made four plan
proposals which were not confirmed. On the fifth attempt,
the court denied confirmation and dismissed the case
because the debtor was unable to propose a confirmable
plan for the following reasons: (1) the plan proposed that
half of the trustee’s fees be paid by the creditors; (2) the
debtor was 60 years old and the plan provided for payments
up to 20 years; (3) the debtor’s farm equipment was very old
and the plan made no provision for equipment repair; (4) the
living expenses were far below the debtor’s historical
expenses; (5) a secured creditor would not receive either the
collateral or payments equal to the secured claim, and (6)
the plan’s haphazard method of paying creditors and
providing income and expense estimates indicated that the
